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Using Collateral to Secure Loans
Collateral is a contractual device 
used by borrowers and lenders around 
the world. Collateral has also been 
around for a long time. In one famous 
example, a pound of Antonio’s flesh 
collateralized Shylock’s loan to Bas-
sanio in Shakespeare’s “Merchant of 
Venice.” Generally, the term collateral 
refers to assets pledged by a borrower 
to secure a loan. The lender can seize 
these assets if the borrower does not 
make the agreed-upon payments on 
the loan, so the lender has some pro-
tection if the borrower defaults. There-
fore, the use of collateral can make 
it easier for firms to obtain loans to 
any businesses post collateral as security for 
loans. Collateral protects the lender if the 
borrower defaults. However, not all borrowers 
put up collateral when taking out loans. 
There’s even some evidence that loans with collateral 
attached may be riskier for lenders.  Why is collateral 
used sometimes, but not others? And why does collateral 
potentially involve more risk? In this article, Yaron 
Leitner considers these questions. He looks at some of the 
explanations for using collateral, focusing on its benefits 
and drawbacks.
finance their investments.
Understanding collateral is im-
portant because it is a characteristic 
feature of bank loans, which help to 
channel resources to their best use.1
While early research focused mainly 
on how collateral affects the borrower’s 
behavior, recent research has also 
incorporated lenders’ behavior, for 
example, how collateral affects lenders’ 
incentives to take care in evaluating 
a business’s prospects. Economists 
have also examined the relationship 
between collateral and risk, empirically 
verifying bankers’ common wisdom 
that collateralized loans are riskier 
for the bank than noncollateralized 
loans. To a significant extent, recent 
theoretical work on collateral has been 
driven by economists’ desire to provide 
explanations for the use of collateral 




We start by focusing on the way 
collateral affects a borrower’s incen-
tives to ensure the business’s success. 
Consider a loan contract where an 
individual borrows some money to 
start a new business. The success of 
the business often depends on actions 
the borrower takes after the loan is 
signed, for example, the way he allo-
cates money among different activities, 
and the effort he expends in choosing 
low-cost/high-value alternatives. Ideal-
ly, the loan contract would specify all 
of these actions. However, in many 
cases, this is impossible because some 
of these actions may not be observable 
to a third party or even to the lender; 
for example, it may be difficult for the 
bank to argue in court that a borrower 
did not exert enough effort in choosing 
the best alternatives.2
If the borrower and lender had 
the same objectives, the fact that the 
borrower’s actions are not observable 
to others would not be a problem. 
1According to the Federal Reserve’s Surveys 
of Terms of Business Lending, more than 50 
percent of the value of all commercial and 
industrial loans made by domestic banks in the 
U.S. is currently secured by collateral (based on 
the surveys for February 2005, May 2005, and 
August 2005).
2 The finance and economics literature refers 
to this hidden action problem as moral hazard.
This term, which was coined in the insurance 
industry, captures the idea that an individual 
who has insurance is less likely to take actions 
to avoid problems. For example, if you have 
comprehensive car insurance with no deduct-
ibles, you may be less careful about locking your 
car or parking it in a safe spot. More broadly, 
the term moral hazard refers to any contracting 
problem where the actions of one party cannot 
be observed by others.10 Q2 2006Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
The borrower would take the actions 
that are best for him, and these ac-
tions would also be best for the lender. 
However, in practice, the borrower and 
lender often have different objectives. 
The lender wants to make sure that 
the loan is paid in full; the borrower 
cares about the profits left after pay-
ing the loan. The borrower may also 
care about some perks that benefit 
him, but not the business as a whole; 
for example, the borrower may enjoy 
expensive business meals, a private jet, 
and so forth. 
Consider the following as an ex-
ample of a conflict of interests between 
borrowers and lenders: A business 
can either succeed or fail. If it fails, 
the loan cannot be repaid, and both 
the borrower and lender get nothing. 
If the business succeeds, the loan is 
paid in full, and the borrower is left 
with the rest of the profits. Now sup-
pose that the borrower can take an 
action that has the following effect: 
If the business is a success, the action 
increases profits; however, the action 
reduces the chances that the business 
will succeed.3 The borrower may be 
happy to take such an action because it 
increases the money left for him — re-
member, he gets paid only if the busi-
ness succeeds.4 The lender, however, is 
unhappy because he is less likely to get 
his money back. 
Anticipating the conflict of inter-
ests above, the lender may demand a 
higher interest rate on the loan, and 
in some cases, he may not lend at all. 
Of course, the borrower can promise 
to take some agreed-upon actions 
according to the lender’s wishes, but 
when these actions cannot be verified 
in court, such a promise is just cheap 
talk.
Collateral May Induce the Bor-
rower to Exert Effort… Suppose the 
borrower posts his house or some of his 
business assets as collateral to secure 
the loan. This may induce him to put 
more effort into ensuring the business 
succeeds because if the business fails, 
the borrower loses his collateral. In
other words, collateral can give the 
borrower the incentive to work harder. 
When the borrower works harder, the 
business is more likely to succeed, and 
the borrower is less likely to default. 
But then the lender may be more will-
ing to lend his money and at a lower 
interest rate. 
…But Using Collateral Is Costly. 
The benefit above comes at a cost. A
business might fail even if the borrower 
exerts a lot of effort; the borrower may 
have bad luck. In this case, the bor-
rower loses the collateral, which may 
be worth more to him than it is to the 
lender. For example, if the borrower 
has posted his house as collateral, be-
ing able to continue living there is 
important to the borrower but not the 
lender. Or if the borrower has posted 
his business assets, they may be worth 
more to him, since he knows how to 
use those assets to produce goods, 
and the lender does not. The lender 
may choose to sell the collateral to 
someone else, but since the lender has 
an incentive to sell as quickly as pos-
sible, he may obtain less than what the 
collateral would normally sell for. In
addition, businesses in a given industry 
often fail together. But when many 
lenders try to sell at the same time, 
the market gets flooded and the price 
they can obtain decreases. Overall, 
economists call this loss in asset value 
a deadweight loss because the lender 
does not gain as much as the borrower 
loses. Another deadweight loss involves 
transferring control of the collateral-
ized assets, which often involves legal 
and other administrative costs. There-
fore, there is a tradeoff: Collateral re-
duces the cost of borrowing because it 
gives the borrower incentives to work 
hard, but it also increases the cost of 
borrowing because the collateral may 
be worth more to the borrower than 
to the lender and because transferring 
control imposes costs. 
A Long-Term Relationship with 
a Bank Can Reduce the Need for 
Collateral. In their paper, Arnoud 
Boot and Anjan Thakor suggest that 
long-term relationships between a 
borrower and a lender can reduce the 
need for collateral. When the loan 
contract is a one-time transaction for 
the bank and borrower, there are two 
ways to induce the borrower to exert 
effort. 
The first is to require collateral, 
as discussed above. The second is to 
lower the interest rate on the loan. A
lower interest rate leaves more profits 
for the borrower and therefore induces 
him to exert effort to make the busi-
ness succeed. However, if the interest 
rate needed to induce the borrower to 
3 An example of such an action is a business 
expansion. If the business succeeds, there are 
more profits. But because the firm spends re-
sources on the expansion, it has less to spend 
cultivating its old customers.
4 Of course, many businessmen and -women are 
motivated by ethical concerns and their reputa-
tions. For the most part, we ignore these moti-
vations to highlight the role of collateral.
Collateral reduces the cost of borrowing 
because it gives the borrower incentives to 
work hard, but it also increases the cost of 
borrowing because the collateral may be worth 
more to the borrower than to the lender and 
because transferring control imposes costs. Business Review Q2 2006 11 www.philadelphiafed.org
exert effort is too low, the loan may 
not be profitable to the lender; he may 
be able to get a higher interest rate by 
lending to other firms or individuals. 
The result is that the lender may need 
to require collateral, and as we have 
seen, this comes at a cost.
When the borrower and lender 
have a long-term relationship, the 
bank has another way to induce the 
borrower to exert effort. The bank 
can promise the borrower better terms 
on new loans in the future, once the 
business shows some signs of success.5
Better terms mean less collateral and 
a lower interest rate. The borrower has 
an incentive to work hard even though 
he pledges less collateral because 
working hard increases the chances 
that the business will succeed and the 
terms on future loans will improve. In
the future, under the new loan terms, 
the borrower has an incentive to work 
hard because of the low interest rate; 
therefore, collateral is no longer need-
ed to induce effort.
But how can the lender afford 
to reduce the interest rate on future 
loans? In a competitive loan market, 
all lenders break even; they make 
enough money just to cover their costs. 
Thus, a lender that offers a lower in-
terest rate and requires less collateral 
than anyone else would lose money. 
The lender can make up for this loss 
by charging a higher interest rate in 
the initial periods. In other words, 
at the beginning of the relationship 
with a borrower, before the business 
shows signs of success, the lender must 
demand an interest rate that is higher 
than a break-even rate; later on, he 
requires a lower interest rate. In this 
way, the bank makes a lot of profits at 
the start of the relationship, and this 
compensates the bank for the loss of 
profits later in the relationship. Over-
all, the bank breaks even, and the cost 
of collateral is reduced because, at the 
start of the relationship, the promise of 
better loan terms reduces the need for 
collateral, and when the relationship 
progresses, collateral is not needed. 
Boot and Thakor’s model predicts 
that borrowers with a longer banking 
relationship are less likely to pledge 
collateral. This prediction is consistent 
with what Allen Berger and Gregory 
Udell found in their 1995 paper. Us-
ing data on collateral requirements 
on lines of credit issued to small busi-
nesses, Berger and Udell found that 
firms that had long-term relationships 
with a lender were less likely to pledge 
collateral.6 An additional 10 years of 
bank-borrower relationship lowered 
the probability of collateral’s being 
pledged from 53 percent to 37 percent. 
Boot and Thakor’s model also predicts 
that the interest rate on the loan will 
decline as the relationship progresses; 
however, results regarding this predic-
tion are mixed.7
5 Such a promise might be believable because 
there is an explicit contract or maybe because 
the bank, which deals with many firms, cares 
about its reputation for keeping its promises.
COLLATERAL AND RISK
We have seen that collateral pro-
vides incentives for the borrower to 
avoid default. Collateral also reduces 
the loss to the lender if a borrower de-
faults on a loan: If the loan is not paid, 
the lender can seize the collateral. One 
might conclude that secured loans are 
safer for the lender than unsecured 
loans. The data, however, show the 
opposite. 
In their 1990 paper, Berger and 
Udell found that net chargeoffs (the 
amount of a loan the bank cannot 
collect) are likely to be higher when a 
loan is secured. They also found that 
borrowers who post collateral are more 
likely to perform poorly; for example, 
they are more likely to be late on 
their payments. These two findings 
suggest that secured loans are riskier 
for the bank; this is consistent with 
conventional wisdom in the banking 
industry.8
A possible explanation is that 
banks require more collateral when 
they perceive a loan to be riskier. 
Banks collect information about bor-
rowers, for example, the borrower’s 
income and performance with past 
loans. Banks can use this informa-
tion to distinguish between borrowers 
who are more risky (that is, borrowers 
more likely to default) and borrowers 
who are less risky (those less likely to 
default), and they require more col-
lateral from the riskier borrowers. 
Even though seizing collateral when a 
borrower defaults reduces the bank’s 
loss, this is not enough to compensate 
When a  borrower 
posts collateral, 
the bank becomes 
less conservative in 
approving his loan.
6 The data came from the 1988-89 Survey of 
Small Business Finance, conducted by the 
Federal Reserve Board and the Small Business 
Administration.
7 See Philip Strahan’s chapter for a survey of 
results from small-business loans around the 
world. For the most part, the finding that col-
lateral requirements fall with the length of the 
relationship is replicated in a number of studies. 
The effect of relationships on loan rates varies 
widely across studies.
8 Ideally, the analysis would use data on indi-
vidual loans. For example, the researcher would 
follow every loan to see if it was collateralized, 
if the borrower paid on time, and what the net 
chargeoff was. Since such data do not exist 
outside bank loan files, Berger and Udell used 
data on chargeoffs and loans past due at the 
bank level. They found that a bank with a larger 
share of collateralized loans has a larger number 
of chargeoffs and loans past due.12 Q2 2006Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
the bank for the fact that the loan was 
riskier to begin with.9
Berger and Udell provide evi-
dence consistent with the explanation 
above.10 Loosely speaking, they show 
in their 1990 paper that a collateral-
ized loan typically has a higher inter-
est rate. To correct for the fact that 
higher interest rates can reflect differ-
ent points in the business cycle, they 
subtract the interest rate on a Treasury 
security with the same duration to 
calculate the markup on the bank loan 
and show that the collateralized loan 
typically has a larger markup.11 Since 
Treasury securities are believed to be 
default free, the markup is a measure 
of how risky the loan is. If we assume 
that a bank charges a higher markup 
when it perceives that a loan is riskier, 
Berger and Udell’s result suggests that 
a bank requires more collateral when it 
perceives a loan is riskier.12
Note that, in theory, the bank 
could eliminate the risk of default by 
requiring more collateral. In practice, 
however, the bank faces risk even if 
the whole value of the loan is secured 
by collateral. First, the value of the 
collateral may decrease over the life of 
the loan. Second, the “automatic stay” 
clause in the U.S. bankruptcy code of-
ten creates a significant delay between 
the time the borrower defaults on the 
loan and the time the lender can seize 
the collateral. Even though the value 
of the collateral is usually preserved, 
the fact that the payment is delayed 
imposes a cost on the lender.13 Accord-
ing to Andrea Eisfeldt and Adriano 
Rampini, the difficulty in repossessing 
collateral explains why some firms may 
prefer to lease their assets, rather than 
to borrow money to purchase assets.14
COLLATERAL AND LENDERS’ 
INCENTIVES
Boot and Thakor’s model focused 
on how collateral affects the borrower’s 
incentives to exert effort in ensuring 
that the loan is paid.15 Roman Inderst 
and Holger Müller shift focus by deal-
ing with the lender’s incentives. The 
problem in their model is that lenders 
may choose not to finance some proj-
ects even though it is socially desirable 
to undertake them. Inderst and Müller 
show that using collateral can improve 
the lender’s incentives to finance these 
projects.
Socially, it is desirable to under-
take a project when consumers are 
willing to pay more than what the 
resources cost, that is, when the proj-
ect creates value that can be shared 
between owners and lenders. When 
this happens, economists say that the 
project has a positive net present value 
(NPV).16 In Inderst and Müller’s mod-
el, banks tend to be too conservative. 
They refuse loans to projects that have 
a positive but relatively low NPV.
In the model, a firm applies for a 
loan from a local bank. The local bank 
faces competition from other lenders, 
but it has an information advantage. 
For firms located nearby, it can dis-
tinguish between projects that have 
positive NPVs and projects that have 
negative NPVs.17 To other lenders, all 
projects look essentially the same, so 
they must charge a higher interest rate 
than the local lender to compensate 
for losses from the possibility of financ-
ing the negative NPV projects.18
How can the local bank use its 
information advantage? It can charge 
a high interest rate, but there is a limit. 
If the bank charges an interest rate 
that is too high, the firm would simply 
go to the other lenders. This places a 
9 Note that the fact that chargeoffs are higher 
for riskier loans does not mean that a bank that 
makes these loans loses money. Not all borrow-
ers default. The bank can charge a higher inter-
est rate when it perceives a loan to be riskier. 
While the bank loses money on riskier borrow-
ers who default on their loans, it makes money 
on those who pay in full.
10 The data came from the Federal Reserve’s 
Survey of Terms of Bank Lending, which con-
tains information on individual characteristics 
of domestic loans.
11 When payments are made before final ma-
turity, the duration of a security is less than its 
maturity. The duration of a security is shorter 
when a larger share of the total payments are 
made earlier. 
12 A high interest rate on a loan can also reflect 
a premium for additional collateral-related 
monitoring costs or for the cost of evaluating 
the loan as discussed in the next section. Yet, 
it is reasonable to believe that a higher interest 
rate reflects more risk.
13 For more details, read Chapter 10 in Gregory 
Udell’s book. 
14 Eisfeldt and Rampini focus on the following 
tradeoff: Leasing allows the firm to borrow more 
because it is easier for the lender to repossess 
the asset. However, leasing is costly because the 
borrower (the lessee) has fewer incentives to 
take appropriate care of the asset.
15 Examples of other papers that focus on collat-
eral and borrower’s incentives are those by Yuk-
Shee Chan and Anjan Thakor and by Arnoud 
Boot, Anjan Thakor, and Gregory Udell.
16 One of the difficulties in saying whether a 
project creates value is that cash flows are re-
ceived at different times; for example, a dollar 
you receive this year is worth more than a dollar 
you receive in five years because you can invest 
it and start earning interest earlier. In addition, 
cash flows can be uncertain; for example, they 
can be high or low. The net present value takes 
into account the timing and riskiness of all cash 
flows; it indicates the value of the project (to-
day) net of the initial investment and net of all 
future investments.
17 The local bank may have an information 
advantage because it is easier to monitor and 
collect information about a firm located nearby.  
More generally, the “local” bank might refer to 
a bank with which the borrower has had prior 
dealings. 
18 The local bank has access to “hard” informa-
tion (for example, the firm’s books) as well as 
“soft” information (for example, information 
about the borrower’s managerial quality). The 
other lenders have access only to hard informa-
tion; thus, they may not have a complete picture 
of the firm. Rebel Cole, Lawrence Goldberg, 
and Lawrence White provide evidence that 
in approving small-business loans, large banks 
tend to employ hard information, whereas small 
banks are more likely to rely on soft informa-
tion.Business Review Q2 2006 13 www.philadelphiafed.org
ceiling on the local bank’s return from 
making the loan, and the lender may 
choose not to finance the project even 
though it has a positive NPV.
To see why, consider the follow-
ing example: Suppose that because of 
competition from other banks the local 
lender must leave the borrower with at 
least $15 million of revenues. Now sup-
pose the local lender estimates that the 
project will cost $110 million and the 
expected revenues will be $120 mil-
lion. Since the revenues are more than 
the cost, the project has a positive 
NPV of $10 million.19 Now suppose 
that because the borrower has no cash, 
the local lender must provide all of the 
investment outlay. Since the borrower 
obtains $15 million, the lender is left 
with an expected revenue of $105 mil-
lion, an amount that is less than the 
initial investment. The local lender 
will reject the loan because if he does 
not, he loses $5 million.20
Collateral Can Improve Lenders’ 
Incentives... To see how collateral can 
improve the bank’s lending policy, it is 
helpful to think first about the bank’s 
lending policy when collateral is not 
used. To do so we make the example a 
little more realistic by recognizing the 
fact that the project can either succeed 
or fail. If the project succeeds, it yields 
$200 million; if it fails, it yields only 
$40 million.
To determine whether the project 
is profitable, the lender needs to esti-
mate the probability that the project 
will succeed. For example, if the prob-
ability of success is half, the expected 
revenue is $120 million (½ x 200 + ½ 
x 40). If the probability is higher, the 
expected revenue is higher. For exam-
ple, if the probability is 80 percent, the 
expected revenue is $168 million (0.8 x 
200 + 0.2 x 40). We saw earlier that in 
the first case (revenue of $120 million), 
the lender will reject the loan. In the 
second case, the lender will approve 
the loan because he will be left with 
expected revenue of $153 million ($168 
million minus $15 million), which is 
more than the initial cost. More gener-
ally, the bank will approve the loan 
only if it thinks that the probability of 
success exceeds some cutoff level. 
Now suppose that the borrower 
posts collateral. The bank seizes the 
collateral only if the project fails. 
Thus, if the project is very likely to 
succeed, collateral has a very small 
effect on the bank’s payoff. However, 
if the project has a lower probability 
of success, the bank’s expected profits 
increase significantly when the bor-
rower posts collateral. In other words, 
collateral increases the bank’s payoff 
mainly from projects whose probability 
of success is relatively low. Thus, when 
borrowers post collateral, the cut-off 
(success) probability for approving a 
loan becomes lower.21
Consistent with the empirical 
findings in the previous section, the 
model associates collateral with more 
risk. Intuitively, when a borrower posts 
collateral, the bank becomes less con-
servative in approving his loan; there-
fore, the borrower is more likely to 
default. The model also predicts that 
borrowers who are more risky to begin 
with will post more collateral and pay 
a higher loan rate (that is, a higher 
markup over the interest on Treasury 
bills) than borrowers who are less risky. 
Here the intuition is simple: When the 
bank faces a risky borrower, it takes 
more measures to protect itself.
...But Too Much Collateral May 
Have a Negative Effect. In Inderst 
and Müller’s model collateral is good 
for society because it allows more proj-
ects that have a positive NPV to be 
financed. Although the bank is less se-
lective in approving projects (so there 
is more default), the bank finances 
only projects that have a positive NPV.
In some cases, however, collateral-
ized lending can actually be bad for 
society. Indeed, if the borrower posts 
a lot of collateral, the lender might be 
tempted to finance a project even if 
he knows the project has a negative 
NPV. The lender may gain from such a 
loan because he obtains the collateral 
whenever the loan goes bad. However, 
society as a whole (in particular, the 
borrower) loses because of the dead-
weight cost associated with collateral 
and because resources are spent on 
projects with a negative NPV.22 In their 
working paper, Philip Bond, David 
Musto, and Bilge Yilmaz use the term 
predatory lending to refer to a situation 
in which a lender knowingly makes a 
loan that is harmful to the borrower.23
But if the borrower is worse off, 
why would he agree to such a loan? 
19 To make the example simple, I ignore the fact 
that revenues are not received at the same time 
as the investment is made. I also ignore the fact 
that revenues are risky.
20After the local lender rejects a loan, other 
lenders, who know that the loan was rejected 
by the local lender, will reject the loan too. The 
reason is that other lenders know there is a 
chance that the loan was rejected because the 
project was found to be unprofitable.
21 When the borrower posts collateral, the bank 
will require a lower interest rate; otherwise, 
the borrower will go to other lenders. Thus, 
under the loan contract with collateral, the 
bank obtains more if the project fails but less if 
the project succeeds. In other words, collateral 
shifts the bank’s payoff from the good states 
(where the project succeeds) to the bad states 
(where the project fails). Requiring a higher 
interest rate would not improve the bank’s lend-
ing policy because a higher interest rate, which 
is paid only if the project succeeds, improves the 
bank’s payoff mainly from projects that would 
have been approved anyway.
22 This may suggest that, in some cases, society 
as a whole can benefit by limiting the maximum 
amount of collateral that can be posted in loan 
contracts or by including bankruptcy exemp-
tions and provisions that limit banks’ ability to 
repossess collateral. 
23 The Bond, Musto, and Yilmaz model focuses 
on one aspect of predatory lending. In practice, 
there may be other important aspects not ex-
plored in this model.14 Q2 2006 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
One possible explanation is that the 
borrower misunderstood the loan con-
tract. Bond, Musto, and Yilmaz offer 
another explanation. They show that 
predatory lending may occur even if 
every borrower fully understands the 
loan contract. 
For this to happen the lender 
must be better informed than the 
borrower; only the lender knows that 
the borrower will be made worse off. 
The bank (the lender) can assess the 
likelihood that the borrower will be 
able to repay the loan better than the 
borrower, a plausible assumption since 
the bank has made many similar loans 
in the past and has followed many 
borrowers. The borrower in turn may 
overestimate his ability to repay the 
loan because of lack of experience or 
maybe because of overconfidence.
Of course, a borrower would never 
apply for a loan if he knew that the 
bank always exploited him. In Bond 
and coauthors’ model, some bor-
rowers overestimate their likelihood 
of repayment, and some borrowers 
underestimate. Only the bank knows 
whether a potential borrower is overly 
optimistic; nonetheless, the bank offers 
the same contract to everyone. Thus, 
the borrower cannot deduce the bank’s 
information and predatory lending can 
occur.24
Collateral May Also Reduce In-
centives to Evaluate Loans. Michael 
Manove, Jorge Padilla, and Marco 
Pagano explore another situation in 
which the use of collateral may lead 
to a bad outcome. As in the previous 
paper, the bank is better informed 
than the borrower, but now the bank 
needs to incur some cost to obtain its 
information. In particular, by exerting 
some effort (for example, conducting 
an investigation), the bank can learn 
whether the project is likely to be prof-
itable.
When the cost of evaluating the 
project is lower than the cost of invest-
ing in a project with a negative NPV,
society benefits if the bank evaluates 
each loan before approving it. Howev-
er, since no one can verify how much 
effort the bank expended, the bank 
may be “lazy,” in Manove, Padilla, and 
Pagano’s terminology. In particular, if 
the bank is protected by collateral, its 
incentive to exert effort in evaluating 
loans is reduced because it can recoup 
the value of the loan by seizing the col-
lateral. If, on the other hand, the bank 
is not protected by collateral, the bank 
evaluates the loan more carefully be-
cause the bank does not obtain much 
if a firm’s project fails.25
As in the model of Inderst and 
Müller, the use of collateral makes the 
bank more lenient in approving loans; 
thus, collateral is associated with more 
default. In Inderst and Müller’s model, 
being more lenient is good because the 
bank approves more loans that have 
positive NPVs. In contrast, in Manove, 
Padilla, and Pagano’s model, being 
more lenient is bad because the bank 
approves some negative NPV projects 
that would not be approved had the 
bank conducted a careful evaluation. 
Moreover, their model does not predict 
that those who post collateral are bor-
rowers of low quality. In their model, 
firms have information about their 
own costs, and firms with low costs 
use collateral to communicate their 
information to the bank. (To learn 
more, see Collateral Can Help the Bank 
Distinguish Between Borrowers.)
COLLATERAL AND FIRMS’ 
INVESTMENT DECISIONS
Until now, we have not been spe-
cific about the type of collateral used. 
Actually, there are two types: outside 
collateral and inside collateral. Out-
side collateral refers to the case where 
the borrowing firm pledges assets not 
owned by the firm. For example, the 
firm’s owner might post his house as 
collateral for a business loan. Inside 
collateral refers to the case where the 
borrowing firm pledges assets it owns, 
such as machines and inventories. 
Although some of the ideas discussed 
earlier may apply to inside collateral, 
the models previously discussed are 
most convincing as explanations of 
outside collateral.
The discussion in the next section 
refers to inside collateral. When a bor-
rower posts collateral for a loan, such a 
loan is called secured debt. Implicitly, 
a firm’s debt is secured by its assets 
because if the firm goes bankrupt, the 
proceeds are used to pay the firm’s 
lenders.26 Therefore, most explanations 
of debt secured by inside collateral 
depend on the firm’s having more than 
one lender. Secured debt gives some 
lenders priority over others for some 
specific set of assets. 
Collateral Can Overcome Un-
derinvestment. In their article, René 
Stulz and Herb Johnson suggest that 
issuing secured debt may allow a firm 
to take advantage of investment op-
portunities with a positive NPV that it 
otherwise could not. Taking advantage 
of such investment opportunities is 
desirable because it increases the firm’s 
value; it increases the pie to be shared 
among the firm’s shareholders and the 
firms’ debt holders (its lenders).
The logic is as follows: Suppose 
the firm is considering borrowing to 
24 Economists refer to this scenario, in which 
the bank offers the same contract to all poten-
tial borrowers, as a pooling equilibrium.
25 In Manove, Padilla, and Pagano’s model, col-
lateral reduces the bank’s incentives to evaluate 
a project before a loan is approved. Raghuram 
Rajan and Andrew Winton explore how col-
lateral affects the bank’s incentives to monitor a 
firm after the loan is approved. They show that 
collateral may actually increase banks’ incentive 
to monitor.
26 To be precise, some claimants, including law-
yers and the IRS, must be paid before lenders 
receive anything.Business Review Q2 2006 15 www.philadelphiafed.org
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ichael Manove, Jorge Padilla, and Marco 
Pagano’s model illustrates what econo-
mists call the screening role of collateral. 
In their model, collateral helps the bank 
distinguish between firms that are likely 
to have positive net present value (NPV)
projects and firms that are likely to have negative NPV
projects.
Suppose there are two types of firms: firms with high 
operating costs and firms with low operating costs. When 
a firm applies for a loan, it knows its operating cost, so it 
has an idea of whether its project is likely to be successful 
and have a positive NPV. But since there are other factors 
affecting the project’s success, the firm cannot know for 
sure. The bank can find out whether the firm has high 
costs or low costs as well as other information about the 
firm’s project, but only after some investigation. Before 
the bank investigates, all firms look identical to the bank. 
To recoup the cost of evaluation the bank must 
charge some fee. To make sure it puts the appropriate 
amount of effort into evaluating the loan, the bank charg-
es only those firms whose loans are approved. Otherwise, 
the bank can make money by charging a fee without do-
ing an evaluation and then rejecting all applicants.a In
turn, firms whose loans are approved end up subsidizing 
the firms whose loans are not approved. But since the 
low-cost firms are the ones whose loans are more likely to 
a In the real world a bank that acted this way would develop a bad reputation and lose loan applicants. The reader should interpret the story in the 
model as a stark version of the real-world problem that if all applicants are charged a fee upfront, the bank will have an incentive to exert too little 
effort in monitoring.
bEconomists refer to this scenario, where one firm distinguishes itself from another firm, as a separating equilibrium. Note that if separation works, 
the firm can avoid investigation by posting less collateral than in the case where all firms behave the same. Since the bank concludes that a firm 
that posts collateral has low cost, further investigation is not likely to change the bank’s decision.
Helmut Bester first introduced the idea that a borrower who thinks his project is likely to succeed prefers to pledge more collateral than a bor-
rower was thinks his project is likely to fail. One of the problems with this type of model is that the “inherently good” borrowers (for example, those 
with low cost) are the ones who post more collateral. This seems inconsistent with the empirical evidence and with the common wisdom in the 
banking industry. 
be approved, they know they are the ones subsidizing the 
high-cost firms.
To avoid this, low-cost firms may try to distinguish 
themselves from high-cost ones by offering to post col-
lateral. An economist would say that the low-cost firm is 
using collateral to signal its information to the bank. Post-
ing collateral is costly to the firm because the firm loses it 
if its project fails. However, since the firm’s costs are low, 
it knows the project is very likely to succeed and the risk 
of losing collateral is not large.
However, low-cost firms can signal their information 
using collateral only if high-cost firms find it unprofitable 
to mimic low-cost firms by posting collateral, too. This is 
the case if the high- and low-cost firms differ enough. For 
a high-cost firm, the cost of putting up collateral is much 
higher than for a low-cost firm because the firm knows it 
is more likely to default. The result is that low-cost firms 
post collateral and high-cost firms do not. 
The bank can then distinguish between the two 
firms. If a firm is willing to post collateral, the bank con-
cludes that the firm has low costs and approves the firm’s 
project without an evaluation; in this case, a careful eval-
uation is not likely to change the bank’s decision. If a firm 
is not willing to post collateral, the bank concludes the 
firm has high costs and evaluates the project; in this case, 
the bank’s evaluation may indicate that the firm’s project 
has a positive NPV, even though the firm has high costs.b
finance a new investment project 
that has a positive NPV and is very 
low risk. Further, suppose the firm 
already has relatively risky debt in 
place. In other words, if the firm 
does not undertake the new proj-
ect, there is a significant likelihood 
it will default on its existing debt 
because its past investments may do 
poorly. If, instead, the firm undertakes 
the new project, the firm is less likely 
to default on its existing debt because 
it can use the cash flow from the new 
project to pay existing debt holders. 
But what if the cash flows from the 
new project are just enough to pay the 
new debt but not enough to pay both 
the new and the existing debt? In this 
case, the firm goes bankrupt, and the 
cash flows from the new project are 
shared between the existing debt hold-
ers and the new debt holders; thus, 
the new debt holders get paid less than 
what was promised to them. If, how-ever, the firm did not have the risky 
debt in place, it could pay its new debt 
holders in full. Accordingly, any new 
unsecured debt holders would supply 
funds only at a very high interest rate, 
perhaps so high that the investment 
would be unprofitable for the firm.
Now suppose the new debt is se-
cured by the new assets purchased with 
the borrowed funds. Then if the firm’s 
initial project fares poorly and the firm 
goes bankrupt, the new assets posted 
as collateral are transferred to the new 
debt holders rather than shared among 
all creditors, new and old. Since the 
new debt holders obtain more when 
the firm goes bankrupt, they are will-
ing to provide funds at better terms 
(a lower interest rate). This, in turn, 
increases stockholders’ profits from 
making the new investment.27
CONCLUSION
Even though collateral has been 
around for a very long time, research 
into economic factors underlying the 
use of collateral has been particularly 
active in the past few years. Econo-
mists have deepened their understand-
ing of the reasons some firms post 
collateral (and others don’t) and of 
society’s costs and benefits from collat-
eralized lending. 
Using collateral protects the 
lender if the borrower defaults. Col-
lateral may also induce the borrower to 
exert more effort to ensure the loan is 
repaid. This is good because borrowers 
with good (positive NPV) investment 
opportunities can obtain credit more 
easily.
However, the use of collateral 
comes at some cost. Transferring con-
trol may be costly, and the lender may 
not value the collateral as much as the 
borrower does. In addition, a lender 
protected by collateral may exert too 
little effort in evaluating projects; he 
may even be induced to engage in 
predatory lending. This is bad from 
society’s standpoint because firms ob-
tain loans for projects that are likely to 
waste resources. A long-term relation-
ship between a borrower and a lender 
can reduce the need for collateral and 
save on some of these costs.  
27 While Stulz and Johnson emphasize priority 
issues, Udell’s book on asset-based finance em-
phasizes the informational value of monitoring 
inside collateral (inventory and accounts receiv-
able). A recent working paper by Loretta Mes-
ter, Leonard Nakamura, and Micheline Renault 
lends empirical support to Udell’s perspective.
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